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Abstract
Richard Albert’s book offers a crucial systematization of 
constitutional amendments, their forms, procedures and 
scope. In doing so, it provides important insights on the 
theory and the practice of constitutional amendment 
design, the difficulty they face and the varieties of un-
amendability, amongst other things. This contribution 
seeks to apply Richard Albert’s analysis to the case of the 
European Union, where the existence of a fully-fledged 
Constitution has long been contested. It claims that this 
analytical framework can help to better understand the 
functioning of EU “constitutional amendments”, i.e. Treaty 
revisions, and their limits, in a context where they have 
remained substantially understudied. 
Keywords: constitutional amendments; European 
Union; European Treaty revisions; unamendability; 
overcostituzionalization.
Resumo
O livro de Richard Albert oferece uma sistematização crucial 
das emendas constitucionais, suas formas, procedimentos 
e escopo. Ao fazer isso, são previstos importantes insights 
na teoria e na prática do desenho das emendas constitu-
cionais, as dificuldades que encontram, as variações de ina-
mendabilidade, entre outras coisas. Esta contribuição bus-
ca aplicar a análise de Richard Albert para o caso da União 
Europeia, onde a existência de uma Constituição integral 
tem sido contestada. Esta análise pode ajudar no melhor 
entendimento das emendas constitucionais da UE, ou seja, 
das revisões de Tratados de seus limites, num contexto em 
que essas não têm sido suficientemente estudadas.
Palavras-chave: emendas constitucionais; União Euro-
peia; revisões de Tratados Europeus; inamendabilidade; 
superconstitucionalização.
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1.  INTRODUCTION
If and to what extent can Richard Albert’s book on constitutional amendments 
provide the ground for assessing and critically review “constitutional amendments” 
procedures and practice at European Union (EU) level? This contribution argues that 
the analysis offered by this book, both from a theoretical-conceptual perspective and 
in terms of concrete choices of forms and design of constitutional amendments’ pro-
cedures, sheds lights on the weaknesses and pitfalls on how EU law has evolved so far 
and on the potential direction to take. The topic has recently triggered once again a 
lively academic debate, on the problem of the overconstitutionalization of EU rules and 
on the difficulty to revise the Treaties with a view to face the multiple crises the EU is 
experiencing.
By drawing on the extensive body of scholarship on the nature of the EU and on 
its comparability with other entities in the international community, this contribution 
first justifies why it is worth exploring the EU constellation through the lens of a study 
on constitutional amendments that primarily – though not exclusively1 – refers to Sta-
tes. Second, the contribution explores how concepts devised or arguments elaborated 
in Richard Albert’s monograph – including constitutional dismemberment, amend-
ment difficulty and its fallacy and variations of unamendability – apply to EU constitu-
tional changes and help to better understand the legitimacy problems surrounding it. 
2. THE COMPARABILITY OF THE EU “CONSTITUTION”
Perhaps there is no other academic debate in EU legal studies that has trigge-
red, directly or indirectly, equal share of scholarly attention than the discussion on the 
constitutional nature of the EU. The reflections on its democratic nature, on sovereignty 
problems and powers conferred, on the autonomy of EU law, on the Peoples v. the Pe-
ople of Europe dichotomy can all ultimately traced back to “the” big question: does the 
EU have a Constitution?
As early as in 1986 the European Court of Justice answered positively to this 
question stating that “the European Economic Community is a Community based on 
1  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 5, 96, 234, 319.
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the rule of law, inasmuch as neither its Member States nor its institutions can avoid a 
review of the question whether the measures adopted by them are in conformity with 
the basic constitutional Charter, the Treaty (emphasis added)”.2 However, the issue is a 
little bit more complex as the EU has evolved. 
Indeed, from a purely international law perspective and according to some re-
cent legal philosophical analyses the EU is nothing more than an international organi-
zation.3 It does no possess original powers, inherent in its fundamental structures, un-
like sovereign entities, but it lives with powers that are conferred through the Treaties 
(Art. 4 TEU) – the Treaty on the European Union, the Treaty on the functioning of the Eu-
ropean Union and the Charter of fundamental rights - and that, thus, could be further 
expanded but also withdrawn. The today’s 27 Member States still remain the “masters 
of the treaties”. Neither the EU is a State, the entity for which modern Constitutions were 
first devised. It does possess a territory with external borders and whose geographical 
reach is vaguely identified with “Europe” by Article 49 TEU. 
More questionable is whether the EU finds it legitimacy in a People. Habermas 
has repeatedly claimed that there is no unified People in the Union, but that the People 
could be constructed through deliberation and discourse in the wide European public 
sphere.4 The recognition of the European citizenship to all nationals of the Member 
States since the Maastricht Treaty (1993) and the (ambivalent) case law of the Court of 
Justice have not supplemented sufficient substance to the construction of the Europe-
an (cross-border) citizen.5 Just a few rights, mainly political rights, are genuinely atta-
ched to the European citizens, while most economic and social rights the EU grants are 
protected for European citizens as well as for third country nationals resident in one of 
the Member States. Surveys shown that there is little sense of belonging to a European 
People (though this might not be very different from what happens in some States with 
highly divided societies).6 
The last decade in particular has seen the success of Nikolaïdis’ idea of “demoi-
cracy” to describe the Union’s system of government: a Union of peoples (plural, as 
many as the Member States), “understood as both states and citizens, who govern 
2  European Court of Justice. Parti écologiste “Les Verts” v. European Parliament. Case C-294/83, ECR 1986 
-01339 (Judgment of the Court of 23 Apr. 1986), para. 23.
3  ELEFTHERIADIS, Pavlos. A Union of Peoples. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 3 ff.
4  HABERMAS, Jürgen. Democracy in Europe: Why the development of the EU into a transnational democracy 
is necessary and how it is possible. European Law Journal, vol. 21, n. 4, p. 546–557, Jul. 2015.
5  AZOULAI, Loïc; BARBOU DES PLACES, Ségolène; PATAUT. Etienne (eds.). Constructing the Person in EU 
Law: Rights, Roles, Identities. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2016.
6  O’FLYNN, Ian. Deliberative Democracy and Divided Societies. Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 
2006, p. 32 ff.
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together but not as one”.7 Controversial as it can be, the “demoicratic” idea reflects a 
compound constitutional structure where institutions representing the Member States 
through their governments, the Council and the European Council, coexist with a Par-
liament directly elected by the peoples(s), through an electoral process that is partly 
regulated by EU law and partly by domestic law.8 In addition to this, there are technical 
bodies, exercising mainly, though not only, executive powers, like the European Com-
mission and the European Central Bank (ECB), who represent the supranational com-
mon interests and whose legitimacy is based on their technical expertise. In relation to 
them, democratic legitimation is either absent – in the case of the ECB strong forms of 
democratic accountability could be even dangerous for the fulfillment of its indepen-
dent mandate – or weak, although the process of appointment of the Commission has 
been more evidently linked to the European Parliament elections since 2009 (Article 17 
TEU). “The lack of the People’s argument”, however, does not appear as a very convin-
cing objection to deny a constitutional status (modelled around the State conception) 
to the EU. Comparative federalism, at least, provide several examples of multinational 
and ethnically divided States, where it is impossible to identify a unified People or whe-
re the idea of a People is constructed over decades or centuries and certainly does not 
predate the specific legal system.9
When looking at the third and last constitutive element of a State, according to 
Jellinek,10 sovereignty, it appears at first that it is missing at the EU supranational level. 
The higher law of the European Union – the Treaties and all the provisions having a 
primary status – is made and changed through complex procedures that requires the 
unanimity of the Member States (Article 48 TEU). At present, both the ordinary and 
the simplified revision procedures set as a requirement the unanimity of the Member 
States to let a Treaty change enter into force (see further section 4). However, it has 
been pointed out that once the rules are set in the Treaties, EU law tends to develop 
autonomously from the Member States and this element would be a sign of a de facto 
sovereignty conquered by the EU.11 The real engine of the European integration, the 
Court of Justice, from the very beginning has devised structural principles governing 
the relationship between national law and EU law, like the principles of primacy and 
7  NIKOLAÏDIS, Kalypso. European Demoicracy and Its Crisis. Journal of Common Market Studies, vol. 51, n. 
2, p. 351-369, mar. 2013.
8  See the European Electoral Act of 1976, as subsequently amended. For an analysis of national legislation 
on the European elections, see: VIOLA, Donatella Maria (ed.). Routledge Handbook of European Elections. 
Abingdon: Routledge, 2015.
9  Recent scholarly contributions have also tried to deconstruct the idea of the “sovereign People” and of 
“peoplehood” as the precondition of the exercise of sovereign powers. See: OKLOPCIC, Zoran. Beyond the 
People: Social Imaginary and Constituent Imagination. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 44 ff.
10  JELLINEK, George. Allgemeine Staatslehre. 3. ed. Berlin: Häring, 1914, p. 180-181.
11  GRIMM, Dieter. Sovereignty: The Origin and Future of a Political and Legal Concept. New York: Columbia 
University Press, 2015, p. 99 ff.
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direct effect and the decentralized enforcement of EU law,12 making national judges 
and administrations responsible for that, and thereby ensuring an autonomy of action 
that could not be originally foreseen. Relatedly, although the discourse on sovereignty 
and constituent power is not perfectly overlapping,13 new narratives have been deve-
loped in relation to the constituent power in the EU that do not tend to reduce cons-
titution-making in this context merely to the will of the “Masters of the Treaties”, the 
States,14 but – mostly as an aspiration – emphasize bottom-up participation of citizens, 
as both national and EU citizens, in the exercise of a pouvoir constituant mixte.15
It is not by chance that the EU is the main point of observation when looking 
at the notion of post-sovereign constellation.16 And the Brexit saga, dominated by the 
mantra of “let’s take back control”, regardless of whether this is really technically pos-
sible as the difficulties in achieving first the withdrawal and now an agreement on the 
future UK-EU partnership show, confirms that the level of European integration reached 
fundamentally questions both the idea of (fully) sovereign Nation States and of a non-
-sovereign Union.
Many scholars have highlighted the similarities between the EU and other fede-
ral experiences or federalizing processes. Robert Schütze has emphasized the similari-
ties between the today’s EU and the US Confederation before the adoption of the 1787 
Constitution.17 Others have also reflected on the many point of contacts between the 
EU and Canada18 or the EU and Switzerland.19 
The deepening of the European integration process, the adoption of a Charter 
of fundamental rights and a gradual clarification of the EU interinstitutional balance20 
have led most scholars to agree that the EU does have a Constitution, well beyond the 
12  European Court of Justice. Van Gend en Loos v. Nederlandse Administratie der Belastingen. Case 26/62 
(Judgment of the Court of 5 Feb. 1963); European Court of Justice. Costa v. Enel. Case 6/64 (Judgment of the 
Court of 15 Jul. 1964); European Court of Justice. Amministrazione delle Finanze dello Stato v Simmenthal 
SpA. Case 106/77 (Judgment of the Court of 9 Mar. 1978).
13  See CÓLON-RÍOS, Joel. Constituent Power and the Law. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2020, p. 263 ff. 
showing that constitution-making powers can be subject to the authority and the indications set by the “sov-
ereign”.
14  PATBERG, Markus. Challenging the masters of the treaties: Emerging narratives of constituent power in the 
European Union. Global Constitutionalism, vol. 7, n. 2, p. 263-293, Jul. 2018.
15  PATBERG, Markus. A systematic justification for the EU’s pouvoir constituant mixte: Principles of constitu-
tional politics in supranational polities. European Law Journal, vol. 23, n. 6, p. 451-463, Nov. 2017.
16  See: MENÉNDEZ, Agustín José; FOSSUM, John Erik (eds.). Law and Democracy in Neil MacCormick’s Le-
gal and Political Theory. New York: Springer, 2011.
17  SCHÜTZE, Robert. From Dual to Cooperative Federalism: The Changing Structure of European Law. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2009, chapter 1.
18  VERDUN, Amie. The Federal Features of the EU: Lessons from Canada. Politics and Governance, vol. 4, n. 3, 
p. 100-110, Aug. 2016, p. 100 ff..
19  FABBRINI, Sergio. Which European Union? Europe after the Euro Crisis. Cambridge: Cambridge University 
Press, 2015, p. 219-256.
20  Since the Court of Justice’s decision in the Meroni case, C-9/56, of 13 June 1958.
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State vs. non-State rhetoric, although it is a problematic one.21 The Constitution of the 
EU is fragmented. In addition to the Treaty provisions, it is also fed by the Constitutions 
of the Member States and anchored to international law as confirmed by the reference, 
respectively, to the common constitutional traditions and to the ECHR in Article 6.3 
TEU makes clear. Moreover, the EU constitutional system heavily relies on domestic ins-
titutions for its implementation. It is a Constitution of “bits and pieces”22 and the level 
of fidelity, loyalty and identification that such a fundamental act is normally expected 
to trigger is rather low or, better, uneven amongst EU citizens, each projecting on that 
text national aspirations, interests, culture and history.23 Nevertheless the Constitution 
of Europe contains the fundamental elements that according to Article 16 of the 1789 
French Declaration of the right of a man and citizen every modern Constitution shall 
entail: separation of powers, both horizontally (amongst the EU institutions, though 
this is put in terms of interinstitutional balance) and vertically (in between the EU and 
the Member States), and the protection of fundamental rights.
While the idea of a Constitution for the EU goes back at least to the 1984 Altiero 
Spinelli’s (failed) project of a Constitutional Treaty,24 it is with the Convention who draf-
ted the Treaty establishing a Constitution for Europe that the debate has been revitali-
zed despite the adverse fate of that Treaty.25 
3. THE FRAGMENTED CONSTITUTIONAL CONSTELLATION OF 
THE EU 
EU primary law - what can be equated to EU constitutional law at first sight - is 
highly fragmented across a variety of sources of law. First of all, the Treaties. The TEU 
codifies some of the fundamental principles of EU law (the principles of conferral and 
of loyal cooperation in Art. 4; the principles of subsidiarity and of proportionality in Art. 
21  See: WEILER, Joseph H.H. The Constitution of Europe: “Do the new clothes have an emperor?” and other 
essays on European integration. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
22  CURTIN, Deirdre. The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces. Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 30, n. 1, p. 17-69, Feb. 1993.
23  ACKERMAN, Bruce. Three Paths to Constitutionalism – and the Crisis of the European Union. British Jour-
nal of Political Science, vol. 45, n. 4, p. 705-714, May. 2015, highlights the importance of the cultural dimen-
sion when it comes to the problematic EU constitutional pathway. It is problematic especially because it is the 
result of a convergence and integration process among countries experiencing different pathways in their 
constitutional transition to democracy.
24  PONZANO, Paolo. The “Spinelli” Treaty of February 1984. Centro di studi sul federalismo - The Federalist 
Debate, vol. XX, n. 3, Nov. 2007. Available at: <http://www.federalist-debate.org/index.php/component/k2/
item/282-the-spinelli-treaty-of-february-1984>.
25  WEILER, Joseph H.H. On the power of the Word: Europe’s constitutional iconography. International Jour-
nal of Constitutional Law, n. 2 & 3, p. 173-190, May 2005; ELEFTHERIADIS, Pavlos. The Idea of a European 
Constitution. Oxford Journal of Legal Studies, vol. 27, n. 1, p. 1-21, Spr. 2007; CRUM, Ben. Learning from the 
EU Constitutional Treaty: Democratic constitutionalization beyond the Nation-State. Abingdon: Routledge, 
2011.
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5), fixes the composition and the main tasks of the EU institutions, sets the procedures 
for amending the Treaties (Art. 48) and contains provisions on common foreign and 
security policy, on the defence policy as well as on social policy, the least integrated 
areas in EU law. 
The TFEU regulates all (the other) EU internal and external policies in great detail 
and the procedures to be followed and the acts to be adopted in each field. The Charter 
of fundamental rights is the EU long “bill of rights” codified, first in 1999 in a Convention, 
proclaimed twice in 2000 and in 2007 (slightly amended), and eventually entered into 
force in 2009. To some extent the Charter has put into the higher law of the Union the 
long-standing case law of the Court of Justice, while other rights, especially the articu-
lated catalogue of social rights, has been added; rights that should be given as much 
as possible an interpretation consistent with the constitutional traditions common to 
the Member States and with the ECHR and are nevertheless enforceable, in theory, only 
when they fall under the scope of application of EU law.
In addition to this, also the 37 Protocols annexed to the Treaties form part of 
EU primary law and their content ranges from the entrenchment of the Statutes of the 
Court of Justice (no. 3), of the European System of Central Banks and of the ECB (no. 4), 
to the privileges and the immunities of the EU (no. 7); from the excessive deficit proce-
dure (no. 12) and the convergence criteria (no. 13) to the provisions on the Schengen 
acquis (no. 19) and the selective enforcement of specific Treaties’ provisions to certain 
countries (nos. 21, 22 and 30); from the system of public broadcasting in the Member 
States (no. 29) to the imports of petroleum products refined in the Netherlands Anthil-
les into the Union (no. 31). 
General principles of EU law established by the Court of Justice, even when not 
codified in the Treaties, like the crucial principle of primacy,26 are part of the primary 
law, too. That said, the area of law that is primary or, by contrast, that is not, in terms of 
the hierarchy of the sources of law, is a bit blurred. For example, the European Electoral 
Act and the Decision on the Union’s own resources, like every act to be adopted by 
unanimity in the Council and approved by every Member State according to the do-
mestic constitutional requirements, seem to have a primary status.27 However, looking 
at the legal bases for their adoption in the Treaties (in the examples made, Arts. 223 
and 311 TFEU), the relevant procedure is described as a special legislative procedure. 
Whether the legislative nature of the procedure affects the rank of the legal source in 
the hierarchy of EU norms, thereby lowering its status to secondary law, remains to be 
determined and the Court of Justice was never given an opportunity to reflect on that.
26  At present, outlined just in Declaration nº 17 to the Treaties, which is a political and non-binding act.
27  PICCIRILLI, Giovanni. La clausola di sbarramento per le elezioni europee tra Corte costituzionale e principi 
comuni a tutti gli Stati membri. Studium Iuris, vol. 12, p. 1430-1437, 2019.
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Not everyone agrees on the usefulness of the categorization of the EU sour-
ces of law along a formal hierarchy of EU norms and for good reasons.28 Indeed, when 
looking carefully at what is inside and what remains outside EU primary law, one clearly 
understands that, on the one hand, there are many EU primary law provisions that are 
not constitutional in substance. On the other hand, there are legal sources which cer-
tainly have a constitutional pedigree, but that are not included in the formal EU primary 
law. This asymmetry between formal constitutional hierarchy and the substantive part 
of a Constitution is rightly emphasized in Richard Albert’s book and it certainly applies 
to the EU.29 There is an important difference between having a constitutional amend-
ment only in name or, rather, a constitutional amendment in its real meaning. Looking 
at the confusion present in the Union, Richard Albert’s claims about the importance of 
reconciling procedure and form with substance of constitutional amendments could 
be fruitfully followed also in the EU, though with some caveats due to the nature of this 
legal system that will be explained shortly.
3.1. The “overconstituzionalization” of EU law
The legal construction of Europe was effectively channeled from a doctrinal 
perspective by the “integration through law” project. Conducted under the leadership 
of Mauro Cappelletti at the European University Institute in Florence in the 1970s and in 
the 1980s and supported by a wide range of legal academics, Community civil servants 
and European judges, this project has provided a constitutional vision to the process 
of European integration solidly grounded by law.30 Law was understood as the main 
tool through which integration could be constructed, the dominant force giving shape 
to the common, then, internal market and to its social dimension.31 As such there was, 
and probably, there is still an imbalance in the influence of law as a discipline compared 
to other social sciences in the European integration. However, how much of this law is 
constitutional in nature?
28  See the work carried out in the framework of the Convention on the future of Europe and, in particular, 
LENAERTS, Koen. How to Simplify the Instruments of the Union. The European Convention - Working Group 
IX, Working Document 07, 6 Nov. 2002.
29  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 268-271.
30  See, notably, PESCATORE, Pierre. Le droit de l’integration. Emergence d’un phénomène nouveau dans 
les relations Internationales selon l’expérience des Communautés Européennes. Genève: A.W. Sijthoff, 
Leiden/Institut Universitaire de Hautes Etudes Internationales, 1972. On the main tenets of that project see 
now BYBERG, Rebekka. The History of the Integration Through Law Project: Creating the Academic Expression 
of a Constitutional Legal Vision for Europe. German Law Journal, vol. 18, n. 6, p. 1531-1556, Nov. 2017.
31  VAUCHEZ, Antoine. L’union par le droit: L’invention d’un programme institutionnel pour l’Europe. Paris: 
Sciences Po Les Presses, 2013; AZOULAI, Loïc. “Integration through law” and us. International Journal of Con-
stitutional Law, vol. 14, n. 2, p. 449-463, Apr. 2016.
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EU policies are heavily regulated, not just by EU legislation (Art. 289 TFEU (Art. 
290 TFEU) and by implementing acts (Art. 291 TFEU), the latter comprising by far the 
greatest part of the legal acts adopted every year in the EU context. This normative 
hypertrophy is also evident from the Treaties. Combined together the TEU, the TFEU 
and the Charter (and Protocols) contain more than 500 articles; an impressive number 
even compared to the Constitution of India, which is well-known for being the longest 
Constitution in the world. However, as Richard Albert rightly points out in his book, it 
is not just a matter of quantity.32 Also the quality of the constitutional drafting matters 
and EU primary law provisions, especially in the TFEU, are very detailed and include 
many norms – procedural and substantive, with their respective exceptions – that at 
national level would be contained in ordinary legislation at best. Dieter Grimm has de-
fined this “capture” of ordinary provisions into the EU constitutional texts as the pro-
blem of “overconstitutionalization” of the EU.33 EU Treaties, in other words, are exactly 
the opposite of how a constitutional text is expected to be drafted, i.e. as an “Incom-
plete Code”.34 Filling the text of the treaties of provisions that in theory are all but cons-
titutional in their content, on the one hand, is functional as a risk-sharing mechanism: 
the limited mutual trust amongst the Member States, amplified by multilingualism and 
by the progressive expansion and deepening of the EU integration process, finds in 
the “overconstitutionalisation” an effective reassurance tool. Those provisions, indeed, 
cannot be modified without the agreement of all the contracting parties in principle. 
To de-constitutionalize them, instead, would mean to open the door to legislation that 
can be adopted and amended with qualified majorities.35
On the other hand, however, “overconstitutionalization” creates a legitimacy pro-
blem because in the case of the EU triggers a de-politicization of the decision-making. 
Once the discipline of a certain subject-matter is entrenched in the treaties it is almost 
impossible to modify it, given the Treaty amendment procedures. Due to the “overcons-
titutionalization”, this resistance to change applies also to issues that would be normally 
subject – outside the EU – to lower lawmaking but that in the Union are thus de facto 
“immunized” against public pressure and political correction.36 Against this backdrop 
and the “original sin” of European treaties going beyond the core functions national 
32  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 261 ff.
33  GRIMM, Dieter. The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case. European Law Journal, 
vol. 21, n. 4, p. 460-473, May. 2015.
34  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 22-24
35  At present qualified majority voting in the Council requests to meet two conditions at the same time: 55 % 
of EU countries vote in favour representing at least 65 % of the total EU population.
36  GRIMM, Dieter. The Democratic Costs of Constitutionalisation: The European Case. European Law Journal, 
vol. 21, n. 4, p. 460-473, May. 2015, p. 460.
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constitutions typically fulfil, it has been suggested that the “de-constitutionalization” 
of EU law would entail a strengthened role for EU political institutions, in particular the 
Council and the Parliament, and a different use of the majority rule: both to authorize 
the selective disapplication of EU norms by Member States in areas covered by simple 
or qualified majority voting and to stop such a selective disapplication – in case it turns 
into free riding – by special majorities in the Council and in the European Parliament.37 
By playing with the majority rule more flexibility would be ensured.
3.2. Norms that are constitutional in nature but are not part of EU pri-
mary law
While the EU treaties are full of provisions that are at odd with the usual contents 
of domestic Constitutions, there are many EU norms that appears as constitutional in 
nature – in that they affect the interinstitutional balance, the relationship between the 
Union and the Member States and well as fundamental rights – but are not entrenched 
into primary law.
These constitutional norms are, for example, those provided in the interinstitu-
tional agreements between the European Parliament, the Commission and the Council: 
“common agreement[s]” through which they “make arrangement for their cooperation” 
and that “may be of a binding nature” (Art. 295 TFEU). The scope of these interinstitutio-
nal agreements ranges from joint programming activities, tools for better law-making, 
transparency and accountability to the citizens38 to the exercise of budgetary powers in 
the Union.39 While the status of these agreements has never been clarified by the Court 
of Justice, some have argued that, given their content and the way they are formed 
(by consolidating existing practices) they amount to “constitutional conventions” in the 
EU.40
In addition to this, there are sources of law like inter se agreements concluded 
among some or all Member States which are not strictly speaking EU norms and that 
37  SCHARPF, Fritz W. De‐constitutionalisation and majority rule: A democratic vision for Europe. European 
Law Journal, vol. 23, n. 5, p. 330-332, Nov. 2017.
38  See the Interinstitutional Agreement on Better Law-Making of 13 April 2016, OJEU L123/1, 12.5.2016.
39  See the Interinstitutional Agreement on budgetary discipline, on cooperation in budgetary matters and on 
sound financial management of 2 December 2013, OJEU C373/1, 20.12.2013 and the Interinstitutional Agree-
ments adopting the Multiannual Financial Framework, the long term (7 year) budget of the EU.
40  BEUKERS, Thomas. Law, Practice and Convention in the Constitution of the European Union. Amster-
dam, 2011. 419 p. Thesis (PhD) - Faculty of Law, University of Amsterdam, p. 201-290; IBRIDO, Renato; LUPO, 
Nicola. Introduzione. “Forma di governo” e “indirizzo politico”: la discussa applicabilità all’Unione europea. In: 
IBRIDO, Renato; LUPO, Nicola (eds.). Dinamiche della forma di governo tra Unione europea e Stati membri. 
Bologna, Il Mulino, 2018. ft. 25.
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nevertheless constitute a significant part of the European “Constitution”.41 These “qua-
si-instruments of EU law”, as they have been described, define constitutional aspects 
of the life of the Union. For example, the Schengen Agreement of 1985, subsequently 
incorporated into EU law in 1997 with the Treaty of Amsterdam, regulates the status of 
the EU citizens, their free movement across the Member States, and, relatedly it also 
protects third country nationals once they have entered the EU (in any of the Member 
States applying the Schengen acquis). In 2012 the Treaty on stability, economic coor-
dination and governance in the Economic and Monetary Union (TSCG), signed by all 
Member States but the UK and the Czech Republic back then,42 sets important rules on 
fiscal discipline for the entire Union and especially for the countries adopting the euro 
as the single currency. To some extent it designs the “Economic Constitution”43 of the EU 
without being formally part of it.44
By the same token, also national constitutional clauses, more or less directly, 
shape European constitutional law. On the one hand, national participation in the EU 
integration process is grounded in the Member States’ Constitutions through ad hoc 
clauses in many cases (see Art. 23 of the German Basic Law) or in general clauses au-
thorizing the limitation of the country’s sovereignty in favour of international organi-
zations.45 Moreover, as Richard Albert points out, drawing on the Spanish case and on 
new Art. 135 of the national Constitution,46 the national fundamental laws are full of re-
ferences to EU law and, by doing so, they provide a crucial vehicle for the enforcement 
of the EU Constitution.
On the other hand, the case law of the Court of Justice, first,47 and then the Trea-
ty themselves (see now Art. 6 TEU) refer to the constitutional traditions common to the 
Member States as constitutional standards for the interpretation of EU law. The rela-
tionship between EU law and national constitutional law is to a large extent osmotic or, 
41  DE WITTE, Bruno; MARTINELLI, Thibaud. Treaties between EU Member States as Quasi-Instruments of EU 
Law. In: CREMONA, Marise and KILPATRICK, Claire (eds). EU Legal Acts: Challenges and Transformations. Ox-
ford: Oxford University Press, 2018, p. 158-188.
42  The Czech Republic subsequently signed this Treaty in 2019, while the UK, as well-know, left the EU on 1 
February 2020.
43  See: GERAPETRITIS, George. New Economic Constitutionalism in Europe. Oxford: Hart Publishing, 2019.
44  Its incorporation into EU law is foreseen by Art. 16 within five years since its entry into force. The deadline 
has expired already, but no measure has been taken.
45  CLAES, Monica. Constitutionalizing Europe at its Source: The ‘European Clauses’ in the National Constitu-
tions: Evolution and Typology. Yearbook of European Law, vol. 24, n. 1, p. 81-125, Nov. 2005.
46  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 5.
47  Since the Court of Justice famous decision in: European Court of Justice. Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr- und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. Case 11/10 (Judgment of the 
Court of 17 Dec. 1970).
CRISTINA FASONE
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 707-732, set./dez. 2020.718 
as has been claimed, they shape together a composite constitutional system,48 where it 
is difficult to kept separate the purely domestic and purely supranational elements. Es-
pecially when the EU (the Community) was devoid of its own catalogue of fundamental 
rights the reference to common constitutional traditions has been crucial to “translate” 
rights protected under domestic Constitution into the European realm.49 The long-las-
ting influence of the “common constitutional traditions” discourse has been confirmed 
also recently despite the EU enlargement and the success, particularly in some Member 
States, of the “constitutional identity” narrative, which tends to highlight national speci-
ficities rather than transnational commonalities.50
The richness of the EU constitutional constellation, also fed by EU sources of law 
that are not comprised into primary law or by sources that formally do not stem from 
the Union, helps to clarify why constitutional amendments and unamendability in this 
supranational context are difficult to be systematized, even from a conceptual level, 
and why Richard Albert’s book can be inspiring (also) from this perspective.
4. EU “CONSTITUTIONAL” AMENDMENT PROCEDURES AND “DIS-
MEMBERMENTS”
To start with, amendments to EU primary law can be mainly catalogued through 
the “integrative model” articulated by Richard Albert: EU “constitutional amendments” 
are directly integrated “into the text of the original master text constitution”.51 Once 
inserted into EU primary law, within the consolidated text of the Treaties, amendments 
are no longer detectable. There is no reference to when, how and how many times a 
particular provision has been changed. The only sign of a previous version of a certain 
treaty article is the indication of the old numbering of that article in brackets. That said 
the Reform Treaty that brought about the “constitutional amendments”, published on 
the EU Official Journal, remains there to signify and make available to the public the list 
of changes that once were adopted, even though it is the consolidated version of the 
treaties that is regularly consulted and used.
In some respect also the “disaggregative model” of constitutional amendments, 
which do not appear in a single codified constitutional document and referred by 
48  BESSELINK, Leonard F.M. A Composite European Constitution. Amsterdam: Europa Publishing, 2007.
49  See, notably, the decision of the Court of Justice in: European Court of Justice. Internationale Handels-
gesellschaft mbH v. Einfuhr - und Vorratsstelle für Getreide und Futtermittel. Case 36/02 (Judgment of 
the Court of 14 Oct. 2004), where the case was solved drawing on the German Basic Law and on the protection 
of human dignity, a right shared by all national constitutions of the Member States.
50  FICHERA, Massimo; POLLICINO, Oreste. The Dialectics Between Constitutional Identity and Common Con-
stitutional Traditions: Which Language for Cooperative Constitutionalism in Europe?. German Law Journal, 
vol. 20, n. 8, p. 1097-1118, Dec. 2019.
51  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 236.
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Richard Albert mainly to the Constitutions of Israel, New Zealand and UK,52 may come 
into play in the EU context. As described in section 3, within the varied constellation 
of EU “constitutional norms”, in addition to Treaty provisions, intergovernmental agree-
ments, constitutional conventions, codes of conduct and legislative acts of constitutio-
nal significance (like the Electoral Act) can be included. Therefore, also the modification 
of one of these sources can be considered as a “disaggregative” constitutional change.
Since the entry into force of the Treaty of Lisbon, in 2009, two types of procedu-
res are envisaged to reform the Treaties (Art. 48 TEU). The ordinary revision procedure, 
“enriched” compared to the pre-Lisbon version, foresees as the starting point a decision 
of the European Council, by simple majority and after having consulted the Parliament 
and the Commission. Within the ordinary revision procedure two options are availab-
le: the default option is the summoning by the President of the European Council of 
a Convention “composed of representatives of the national Parliaments, of the Heads 
of State or Government of the Member States, of the European Parliament and of the 
Commission” while the ECB can be consulted if the proposed changes affect mone-
tary policy (Art. 48, par. 3 TEU). In theory this Convention is only asked to examine the 
proposed amendments and to adopt by consensus a recommendation to a conference 
of representatives of national governments that determines “by common accord the 
amendments to be made to the Treaties” (Art. 48, par. 4 TEU). The subordinated option, 
instead, allows the European Council, by simple majority and with the consent of the 
European Parliament, to waive the requirement to establish a Convention whenever 
the scope of the change does not justify the setting up of this ad hoc body, which is 
costly and makes the process longer but is expected to grant a more solid democratic 
underpinning to the Treaty change. In these circumstances, it is the European Council 
that defines the mandate of the intergovernmental conference.
Interestingly, none of these ordinary procedures has been used since 2009. The 
procedure leading to the setting up of the Convention, although Art. 48 TEU does not 
clarify with which proportion the different institutions involved have to be represented, 
is a codification of the practice followed when the Charter of fundamental rights and 
the Constitutional Treaty were drafted. On those occasions, as to strengthen the de-
mocratic commitment of the constitution-making exercise, members of parliaments, 
especially from national parliaments, were in a majority.53 Moreover, the Conventions 
worked for more than one year each, in public and in a transparent manner, “as if” they 
were to draft and agree on the Treaty amendments nor just to issue recommendations 
52  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 234
53  MANZELLA, Andrea. The convention: a new model for constitution-making. In: Europeos (ed.). Institution-
al reforms in the European Union. Rome: Europeos, 2002. p. 159-182.
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to the intergovernmental conferences, which found themselves with tied hands when 
deciding on the Conventions’ proposals.54
While the history of the European integration has known just two Conventions, 
both organized before they were codified as the ordinary method for Treaty changes, 
all treaty revisions have featured the crucial work and deliberation of an intergover-
nmental conference, working behind closed doors. The secrecy of the constitution-
-making process, particularly with the gradual increase of the Member States, was key 
to make the process smooth. Indeed, intergovernmental conferences have normally 
ensured a deal on Treaty amendments within a few months, in preparation of the much 
longer ratification stage.
In fact, what has proved to be very cumbersome in the process of adoption of 
EU “constitutional amendments” is the second stage, the national one, after the reform 
treaty has been signed: “The amendments shall enter into force after being ratified by 
all the Member States in accordance with their respective constitutional requirements 
(Art. 48, par 4 TEU).” As has been the case during the “season” of Treaty changes, from 
the Single European Act of 1987 until the Lisbon Treaty, the failure – with the Consti-
tutional Treaty – or the delay in the entry into force of Treaty revisions was due to the 
national constitutional requirements set in combination with the unanimity rule.55 Re-
ferendums – mandatory or optional – held in some Member States, namely Denmark, 
France, Ireland, the Netherlands have seriously challenged the possibility to achieve 
a successful ratification in these countries, with implications for the whole EU. By the 
same token, the judgments of some Constitutional and Supreme Courts on the ex ante 
review of the constitutionality of the Treaty revisions or of the domestic norms for their 
ratification and implementation have been awaited with some concerns.56 In the event 
of a conflict, either the country cannot ratify the treaty change, thereby leading to an 
European impasse, or the national Constitution has to be changed (as it regularly oc-
curs in Ireland).
54  On the Convention method, see DELOCHE-GAUDEZ, Florence. La Convention européenne sur l’avenir 
de l’Europe: ruptures et continuités. In: AMATO, Giuliano; BRIBOSIA, Emmanuelle and DE WITTE, Bruno (eds.). 
Genèse et destinée de la Constitution européenne: commentaire du traité établissant une Constitution 
pour l’Europe à la lumière des travaux préparatoires et perspectives d’avenir. Bruxelles: Bruylant, 2007. p. 47-85 
and PINELLI, Cesare. The Convention Method. In: LUPO, Nicola; FASONE, Cristina (eds.). Interparliamentary 
Cooperation in the Composite European Constitution. Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2016. p. 57-72. 
Changes were nevertheless introduced by the intergovernmental conferences both on the Charter and on the 
constitutional Treaty.
55  Although Article 48, para 5 TEU leaves the door open to bypass the unanimity requirement under the 
ordinary revision procedure, potentially: “If, two years after the signature of a treaty amending the Treaties, 
four fifths of the Member States have ratified it and one or more Member States have encountered difficulties 
in proceeding with ratification, the matter shall be referred to the European Council”. See: CLOSA, Carlos. The 
Politics of Ratification of EU Treaties. Abingdon: Routledge, 2013, p. 30-39.
56  German Constitutional Tribunal, Second Senate. Judgment on the Treaty of Lisbon and the related acts 
of approval and implementation. 2 BvE 2/08 (Judgment of the Court of 30 Jun. 2009).
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This problem can be bypassed, should one of the simplified revision procedures, 
introduced by the Lisbon Treaty, be followed. Under Art. 48, par. 6 TEU Part Three of 
the TFEU, on the EU internal policies and actions, can be modified in its entirety or just 
some clauses. Such a procedure, however, cannot entail an increase in the Union’s com-
petences (unlike the ordinary revision procedure). In this case, the Treaty amendment is 
agreed directly in the European Council by unanimity, after consulting the Parliament 
and the Council as well as the ECB, if the monetary policy is concerned. The European 
Council decision enters into force only if approved by the Member States according to 
national constitutional requirements. By not mentioning the ratification, but just the 
approval, Art. 48, par. 6 TEU was thought of making the entry into force smoother than 
with the ordinary revision procedure. However, the only case when this procedure was 
used to date, in 2011, to modify Art. 136 TFEU and create a permanent fund, the Euro-
pean Stability Mechanism (ESM) financed by national budgets to rescue Eurozone cou-
ntries in need of financial assistance, has shown that this expectation was wrong. The 
approval of the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU has been challenged in front 
of domestic courts and has even reached the Court of Justice of the EU (see section 5).57
The second simplified revision procedure, never applied so far, consists in ac-
tivating the so-called “passerelle clauses”, only in limited circumstances (art. 48, par. 
7 TEU). Notably to shift from unanimity rule to qualified majority rule in the Council, 
whenever the TFEU or Title V of the TEU provides for unanimity, and to shift from a spe-
cial legislative procedure (which normally assigns to the Council a central stage) to the 
ordinary legislative procedure (where the Parliament and the Council act on an equal 
footing) when the TFEU prescribes the special legislative procedure. Thus “passerelle 
clauses” are meant, on the one hand, to ease the adoption of an act and, on the other, 
to make it more democratic by including the Parliament as a real decision-maker. For 
this to happen the European Council shall act by unanimity, after the Parliament has 
given its consent by a majority of its members. In addition to this, the initiative of the 
European Council is notified to the 27 national parliaments that within six months can 
notify their opposition. The European Council’s Decision is eventually adopted only if 
no objection has been raised by any of the national parliaments.
It follows that also for the simplified revision procedures the unanimity require-
ment for Treaty amendments is confirmed and, in any event, any constitutional change 
in the EU has to go through a European and a national stage. Linked to this discourse is 
the problem of the constitutional amendment difficulty in the EU.
57  GRANAT, Katarzyna. Approval of Article 136 TFEU Amendment in Poland: The Perspective of the Constitu-
tional Court on Eurozone Crisis law. European Public Law, vol. 21, n. 1, p. 31-46, Feb. 2015; BARDUTZKY, Samo. 
Constitutional Courts, Preliminary Rulings and the “New Form of Law”: The Adjudication of the European Sta-
bility Mechanism. German Law Journal, vol. 16, n. 6, p. 1771-1790, Mar. 2015, who highlights that very often 
the constitutional challenges against the European Council Decision 2011/199/EU have been combined to 
those against the Treaty on the ESM.
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As Richard Albert observes, despite the very high threshold for agreeing on Tre-
aty changes, in the course of the European integration process amendments have been 
rather frequent. “One might think that building consensus among a multinational body 
of nearly thirty countries in the European Union would be more difficult than meeting 
the unanimity threshold among thirteen states under the Articles of Confederation. 
And yet the Treaties of the European Union have been amended many times,58 more 
frequently than the Articles, which have fewer veto players and a lower denominator”.59 
Indeed, in between 1987 and 2009 a “semi-permanent Treaty revision process”60 has 
been witnessed: in about thirty years 6 reform treaties and a Charter of fundamental 
rights have been drafted, plus 4 accession Treaties, which also modify certain treaty 
provisions (for example on the composition of the institutions).61 What is remarkable 
is not just the number of subsequent treaties, but also the scope of the changes they 
brought about. The founding treaties were changed extensively, reform after reform, 
for what concerns the institutional architectures, the EU competences and policies 
and fundamental rights, adding a series of details that are unusual in the drafting of 
constitutional texts (see section 3). For some decades the continuous process of Treaty 
change was probably favoured by the spillover effects of the end of the Cold War and 
the German reunification and by a consensual mode of operation within and among 
the EU institutions and the Member States targeting the idea of “an ever closer Union”. 
By 2005, however, when the people in two founding Member States, France and the 
Netherlands, rejected the Constitutional Treaty at the referendums, and following the 
accession of 12 new countries from the Eastern bloc, the “permissive consensus”62 had 
gone.
The present situation in the Union is that of an impasse with regard to Treaty 
revisions, while the Eurozone crisis, the refugee crisis, Brexit, the rule of law problems 
and now the pandemic have revealed that the EU is in desperate need for a reform. De-
eply divided internally and with limited public support, the EU institutions have tried to 
58  PEERS, Steve. The Future of EU Treaty Amendments. Yearbook of European Law, vol. 31, n. 1, p. 19-22, Apr. 
2012.
59  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 96.
60  DE WITTE, Bruno. The Closest Thing to a Constitutional Conversation in Europe: The Semi-Permanent Treaty 
Revision Process. In: BEAUMONT, Paul, LYONS, Carole and WALKER, Neil (eds.). Convergence and Divergence 
in European Public Law. Oxford-Portland: Hart Publishing, 2002, p. 39.
61  Reform Treaties were, in order, the Single European Act, the Treaty of Maastricht, the Treaty of Amsterdam, 
the Treaty of Nice and the Charter of fundamental rights (the latter proclaimed but not entered into force until 
2009), the Constitutional Treaty (failed), and the Treaty of Lisbon. The accession treaties, instead, were those 
concerning Norway, Austria, Finland and Sweden (1994), concerning Cyprus, Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, 
Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, Slovakia, Slovenia (2003), concerning Bulgaria and Romania (2005), and con-
cerning Croatia (2011).
62  HOOGHE, Liesbet and MARKS, Gary. A Postfunctionalist Theory of European Integration: From Permissive 
Consensus to Constraining Dissensus. British Journal of Political Science, vol. 39, n. 1, p. 1-23, Jan. 2009.
Constitutional amendments’ theory and troubles at supranational level: 
Rev. Investig. Const., Curitiba, vol. 7, n. 3, p. 707-732, set./dez. 2020. 723
launch a new process of reflection about Treaty changes, through a Conference on the 
Future of Europe expected to start to work in Fall 2020. The composition does not appe-
ar very different from a Convention under Art. 48 TEU, but it is devoid of any clear man-
date in relation to the discussion of Treaty amendments and its structure has already 
led to allegations about the lack of people’s involvement in the process, being thought 
as a top-down exercise.63 It is the usual criticism emerging every time Treaties are chan-
ged due to the limited democratic credentials of the revision procedures, taking into 
account the detachment or disconnection between EU citizens and EU institutions.64
However successful the experience of the Conference on the Future of Europe 
can be, it appears that the situation in the Union is now quite closed to that described 
by Richard Albert as “constructive unamendability”. In the present political, social and 
economic circumstances “the codified thresholds required to amend (…) [the treaties] 
are so onerous that reformers cannot realistically (though they could theoretically) sa-
tisfy the standard. What results is the impossibility of amending the rule, even though 
formally it is amendable”.65
Over the last few years, this constitutional amendment difficulty in the EU has 
triggered the emergence of something close to a “constitutional dismemberment”66 – a 
transformative change with consequences far greater than an amendment – according 
to some readings of these occurrences. For example, the impossibility to reach unani-
mity for a Treaty change that would have introduced the obligation for Member States 
to respect a structural balanced budget has led all EU countries but the Czech Republic 
and the UK to sign already evoked TSCG, so to formally resort to international law. This 
is not strictly prohibited under EU law and the Court of Justice in any event could have 
been involved in principle in reviewing its compatibility with the Treaties. Moreover, 
the problem the TSCG triggers is not about the content of what it prescribes. Rather, 
questionable is the precedent it creates, in allowing to bypass the ordinary or simplified 
Treaty revision procedures whenever their standards are too difficult to meet.67 Indeed, 
the TSCG also sets its own rules for the entry into force, not just moving away from una-
nimity, but clearly identifying at least two clusters of countries, within and outside the 
Eurozone, for the sake of the ratification. Art. 15, par. 2 of the TSCG states that the Treaty, 
63  ALEMANNO, Alberto. Europe’s Democracy Challenge: Citizen Participation in and Beyond Elections. Ger-
man Law Journal, vol. 21, Special Issue n. 1, p. 35-40, Jan. 2020.
64  LINDSETH, Peter L. Power and Legitimacy: Reconciling Europe and the Nation State. Oxford: Oxford Uni-
versity Press, 2010, p. 234.
65  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 158.
66  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 78.
67  In the European Court of Justice. Defrenne v Sabena. Case 43/75 (Judgment of the Court of 8 Apr. 1976), 
the Court of Justice had clarified that the EU Treaties can only be modified through the revision procedure 
provided for by the Treaties themselves.
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agreed in 2012, enters into force on 1 January 2013 “provided that twelve Contracting 
Parties whose currency is the euro have deposited their instrument of ratification, or on 
the first day of the month following the deposit of the twelfth instrument of ratification 
by a Contracting Party whose currency is the euro, whichever is the earlier”. Considering 
that in 2012 the EU Member States were 27 and 17 where the Eurozone countries the 
12-ratification threshold is considerably lower than the usual EU one. Moreover, the 
TSCG devalues the weight of the ratifications of the countries outside the Euro area 
– unlike Art. 48 TEU, which places everyone on an equal footing – and also creates a 
double standard between the 12 Eurozone countries that are the first to ratify and the 
others.68
A second potential dismemberment is occurring, again, within the Economic 
and Monetary Union and, in contrast to the former, has gained much more public at-
tention. It refers to the role taken up by the EBC since 2011 through its unconventional 
monetary operations to preserve the stability of the euro. Given the clear-cut division 
between the fully integrated monetary leg of the Economic and Monetary Union and 
the economic policies that are still managed at national level and just coordinated 
through the EU, the ECB could only protect the Eurozone against asymmetric shocks by 
interpreting its mandate extensively; a mandate that is conceived in very strict terms in 
the Treaties. It followed a strong clash between the ECB and the Court of Justice ruling 
in favour of the central bank (to have acted within its mandate), on the one hand, and 
the German Constitutional Court, on the other.69 The saga is still open at the time of 
writing, but, again, the problem with the ECB’s mandate is that there is no unanimous 
consent to modify it in the Treaties to make borrowing possible as it probably should 
and therefore the financial support lend by this institution on the financial markets has 
gone too far according to its critics,70 despite its genuine intention to “do whatever it 
takes to save the euro”.71
Besides these recent examples, the list of “candidates” to be treated as dismem-
berments in EU law can be longer, should the case law of the Court of Justice be con-
sidered as a source of dismemberment. Without any explicit legal basis in the Treaties 
68  CLOSA, Carlos. Moving Away from Unanimity: Ratification of the Treaty on Stability, Coordination and Gov-
ernance in the Economic and Monetary Union. RECON Online Working Paper, nº 2011/38, 17 Feb. 2012.
69  For the latest episode of the saga, see: German Constitutional Tribunal, Second Senate. 2 BvR 859/15 (Judg-
ment of the Court of 5 May. 2020), which declared ultra vires the ECB’s Public Sector Purchase Programme and 
the decision of the Court of Justice confirming its validity, pending further clarifications by the ECB as to the 
proportionality of its action.
70  BOBIĆ, Ana; DAWSON, Mark. COVID-19 and the European Central Bank: The Legal Foundations of EMU as 
the Next Victim? Verfassungsblog, 27 Mar. 2020. Available at: <https://verfassungsblog.de/covid-19-and-the-
european-central-bank-the-legal-foundations-of-emu-as-the-next-victim/>. 
71  See the famous speech by the President of the ECB, Mario Draghi, at the press conference of 6 August 2012 
announcing the Outright Monetary Transaction Programme.
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foundational principles of EU law, like primacy and direct effect,72 have been identified 
by the Court of Justice as the grundnorm of the Union. Despite their lack of codification 
in EU primary law, their acknowledgement by the Court has “transformed” the nature of 
the European integration process compared to what had been until the 1960s. As such 
the conceptualization of “dismemberment” by Richard Albert can find an interesting 
litmus test even in the context of a sui generis constitutional constellation like the EU.
5. CONSTITUTIONAL UNAMENDABILITY IN EU LAW
To conclude, some final remarks can be devoted to the contribution of Richard 
Albert’s monograph to the question of constitutional unamendability in EU law. The 
limits to constitutional reforms and unconstitutional constitutional amendments have 
come under increasing academic scrutiny.73 Perhaps democratic decay and the crisis of 
liberal constitutionalism have contributed to make these issues “hot topics” in compa-
rative constitutional law. By the same token, the multiple crises the EU has experienced 
over the last few years and, in particular, the rule of law backsliding in Eastern Europe 
have made quite compelling the identification of the ultimate constitutional principles, 
the foundations of EU law. The debate is not new,74 but it is resurging now.75 Most Cons-
titutions in the Member States sets explicit limits to constitutional amendments or have 
implicit limits, as interpreted by Courts. As such they also set the boundaries to further 
European integration.76
In the 1990s some scholars claimed that substantive limits to the revision of the 
EU Treaties were in place, for example, the respect of human rights, of the rule of law 
and of democratic principles.77 However, then and now the plain words of the Treaties 
do not offer examples of codified unamendable clauses.78 Interestingly, it has been ar-
gued that the values enshrined in Art. 2 TEU – “respect for human dignity, freedom, 
72  See ft 12 above.
73  See, amongst many, ROZNAI, Yaniv. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments: The Limits of 
Amendment Powers. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017.
74  See, e.g., DE WITTE, B. Rules of Change in International Law: How Special is the European Community?. 
Netherlands Yearbook of International Law, vol. 25, p. 299 ff., Dec. 1994.
75  See: PASSCHIER, Reijer; STREMLER, Maarten. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in European 
Union Law: Considering the Existence of Substantive Constraints on Treaty Revision. Cambridge Journal of 
International and Comparative Law, vol. 5, p. 337-362, Jan. 2016.
76  BESSELINK, Leonard F.M.; CLAES, Monica; IMAMOVIĆ, Šejla; REESTMAN, Jan Herman. National constitu-
tional avenues for further integration, Study for the European Parliament. Brussels: Directorate General for 
Internal Policies, 2014.
77  CURTIN, Deirdre. The Constitutional Structure of the Union: A Europe of Bits and Pieces. Common Market 
Law Review, vol. 30, n. 1, Feb. 1993, p. 17 ff. and WEILER, Joseph H.H.; HALTERN, Ulrich. The Autonomy of the 
Community Legal Order: Through the Looking Glass. Harvard International Law Journal, vol. 37, n. 2, 1996, p 
411 ff.
78  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 140.
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democracy, equality, the rule of law and respect for human rights, including the rights 
of persons belonging to minorities”, “common to the Member States in a society in whi-
ch pluralism, non-discrimination, tolerance, justice, solidarity and equality between 
women and men prevail” – amount to foundational principles of the Union,79 but this 
has never been confirmed by the Court of Justice, which to date has always refused to 
deliver judgments grounded on this article only.
However, looking at the Court of Justice’s jurisprudence there are clear signs of 
“interpretative unamendability” in Richard Albert’s terms,80 although this Court lacks a 
doctrine on unconstitutional constitutional amendments. As anticipated (in section 2), 
the Court of Justice is the fundamental engine of the “integration though law” in the 
Union and many developments, in particular advancements in the way EU law has been 
interpreted in its relationship with the Member States are due to the fundamental role 
played by this Court. Up to the point that scholars have talked of a “judicial construction 
of Europe”.81 Often accused of “judicial activism” and of monopolizing the Treaties,82 the 
Court of Justice, in cooperation with national courts through the preliminary reference 
procedure (Art. 267 TFEU),83 has let EU law evolve in a direction that could hardly be 
foreseen in the 1950s when it was established.
In a few landmark judgments the Court of Justice has identified some founda-
tional rules and principles. Although were not detected in relation to Treaty revisions, 
they have emerged in such contexts that allowed to consider them as the ultimate rules 
for the functioning of the EU. In the Kadi judgment, in the framework of a potential 
clash between an UN Security Council’s Resolution against suspect terrorists and EU 
law’s guarantees of due process, the Court affirmed that by no means the EU could 
violate its commitment to rule of law and to fundamental rights’ protection.84
Other important statements of the Court with regard to EU law foundational 
principles/rules were rendered in the framework of opinions or judgments dealing with 
the prospective creation of alternative judicial mechanisms or new Courts that could 
79  PASSCHIER, Reijer; STREMLER, Maarten. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in European Union 
Law: Considering the Existence of Substantive Constraints on Treaty Revision. Cambridge Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, vol. 5, Jan. 2016, p. 357. According to VON BOGDANDY, Armin; SPIEKER, Luke 
D. Countering the Judicial Silencing of Critics: Article 2 TEU Values, Reverse Solange, and the Responsibilities 
of National Judges. European Constitutional Law Review, vol. 15, p. 391-426, Sep. 2019 these values also 
represent clear constitutional limits to Member States’ actions.
80  ALBERT, Richard. Constitutional Amendments: Making, Breaking and Changing Constitutions. Oxford: 
Oxford University Press, 2019, p. 149 ff.
81  STONE SWEET, Alec. The Judicial Construction of Europe. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2004.
82  DAVIES, Gareth. Does the Court of Justice own the Treaties? Interpretative pluralism as a solution to over‐
constitutionalisation. European Law Journal, vol. 24, n. 6, p. 358-375, Nov. 2018.
83  CLAES, Monica. The National Courts’ Mandate in the European Constitution Oxford-Portland: Hart Pub-
lishing, 2006.
84  European Court of Justice. Kadi and Al Barakaat v. Council. Joined Cases C-402/05 P and C-415/05 P 
(Judgment of the Court of 3 Sep. 2008), paras 281, 284 and 316.
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undermine the judicial enforcement of EU law as set in the Treaties.85 Hence in the 1991 
Opinion on the treaty establishing the European Economic Area the Court considered 
that the treaty would have created a system of courts incompatible with the EU judicial 
system defined in the EU Treaties and that not even a Treaty amendment could have 
remedied to this clash “with the very foundation of the Community”, i.e. inherent in the 
design and functioning of its courts.86 A similar reasoning was developed later on, when 
the Court of Justice was asked to review the draft agreement setting up a European 
patent court.87 Likewise, in the Opinion on the draft agreement on the EU accession to 
the ECHR and in the judgment in the Achmea case,88 the Luxembourg Court affirmed 
that it is not possible to dismantle the crucial relationship between the courts in the 
Member States and the Court of Justice, thereby hinting to the fact that the preliminary 
reference procedure (Art. 267 TFEU) amounts to an unamendable mechanism of EU law 
in that it ensures the autonomy of the Union’s legal system and the consistency and 
uniformity of its interpretation.89
Nevertheless, it is with the Pringle judgment in 201290 that the Court engages 
clearly with “interpretative unamendability”. Through a preliminary reference by the 
Irish Supreme Court, the European Court was given the opportunity to review the com-
patibility of a Treaty amendment adopted under the simplified revision procedure, the 
already mentioned Decision EU 2011/199, with EU primary law (as well as to deal with 
other legal issues the remains out of the scope of this contribution). This Decision was 
meant to provide a legal basis in the EU Treaties, Art. 136, par. 3 TFEU, to the rescue fund 
set up, on a permanent basis, though an intergovernmental agreement amongst Euro-
zone countries, the Treaty on the ESM. The Court of Justice considered itself entitled to 
review the validity of Treaty amendments; a move that could not be given for granted.91 
Indeed, the Commission and the European Council as well as ten intervening States 
claimed that the Court did not have jurisdiction under Art. 267 TFEU to check the validi-
ty of Treaty provisions. The Court seemed first to concur with this view, but then it went 
85  PASSCHIER, Reijer; STREMLER, Maarten. Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendments in European Union 
Law: Considering the Existence of Substantive Constraints on Treaty Revision. Cambridge Journal of Interna-
tional and Comparative Law, vol. 5, Jan. 2016, p. 354 ff.
86  European Court of Justice. Opinion 1/91. European Free Trade Association [1991] ECR I-6079, para 71.
87  European Court of Justice. Opinion 1/09. European and Community Patents Court [2011] ECR I-1137.
88  European Court of Justice, Full Court, Opinion 2/13, of 18 December 2014, and European Court of Justice, 
Grand Chamber. Slovak Republic v. Achmea. Case C-284/16 (Judgment of the Court of 6 Mar. 2018).
89  MARTINICO, Giuseppe. Building Supranational Identity: Legal Reasoning and Outcome in Kadi I and Opin-
ion 2/13 of the Court of Justice. Italian Journal of Public Law, vol. 8, n. 2, p. 260-261, 2016.
90  European Court of Justice. Thomas Pringle v. Government of Ireland. Case C- 370/12 (Judgment of the 
Court of 27 Nov. 2012).
91  MURPHY, Ciara. Pringle – The Unconstitutional Constitutional Amendment Conundrum. European Law 
Blog, Dec. 6 2012. Available at: <https://europeanlawblog.eu/2012/12/06/pringle-the-unconstitutional-con-
stitutional-amendment-conundrum/>. 
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on saying in the light of the conditions set by Art. 48, par. 6 TEU to follow a simplified 
revision procedure (that can only affect Part Three of the TFEU and cannot increase the 
EU competences), that the Court must ensure that “the law is observed in the interpre-
tation and application of the Treaties”. The Court eluded the distinction between proce-
dural and substantive “constitutional amendment” review, but it engaged also with the 
latter to assess whether the European Council’s Decision encroached upon monetary 
policy and (illegitimately) expanded the economic policy competence of the Union. In 
both cases the answer was negative also because the Court found that the contested 
Decision was not really needed for the sake of adopting the ESM Treaty.92 This case illus-
trates that there are also substantive limits to Treaty amendments under the simplified 
revision procedure, but only future developments can tell whether the Court is willing 
to check the compliance of these limits by Treaty amendments adopted under the ordi-
nary revision procedure. From a legal perspective this appears possible, but it would be 
politically difficult given the present situation of “constructive unamendability”.
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